The Sky Has Not Fallen Yet on Punitive Damages in Admiralty Cases by Jones, John Paul
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Law Faculty Publications School of Law
2009
The Sky Has Not Fallen Yet on Punitive Damages
in Admiralty Cases
John Paul Jones
University of Richmond, jjones@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/law-faculty-publications
Part of the Admiralty Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
John Paul Jones, The Sky Has Not Fallen Yet on Punitive Damages in Admiralty Cases, 83 Tul. L. Rev. 1289 (2009).
The Sky Has Not Fallen Yet on Punitive
Damages in Admiralty Cases
John Paul Jones*
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1289
II. A VERY BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF A WIDELY REPORTED CASE ......... 1291
III. PRELIMINARY POINTS ................................................................ 1292
A. ThatRobins Dry Dock Is Subject to Exception Is
No Longer for Speculation in Other Courts .................... 1292
B. That Maritime LawAffords Pumtve Damages for
Recklessness Is No Longer for Debate ........................... 1293
C That a GeneralMartime Law Governs in Cases of
Tort Is Confirm ed ............................................................ 1294
I V THE LOGIC OF MILES vAPEXMARINE CORP. DOES NOT
DICTATE PREEMPTION IN THIS CASE ......................................... 1295
V SOMETIMES, PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD NOT EXCEED
N AMOUNT THE COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AWARDED ........... 1296
VI. IT REMAINS To BE SEEN WHETHER AN OWNER
OTHERWISE WITHOUT FAULT WILL BE LIABLE
VICARIOUSLY FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE
RECKLESSNESS OF THE SHIP'S MASTER .................................... 1297
V II. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................ 1302
I. INTRODUCTION
As surely everyone knows, the United States Supreme Court has
recently brought the Due Process Clause to bear on awards of punitive
damages made pursuant to state law.' The law of the land now
* © 2009 John Paul Jones. Professor of Law, University of Richmond. After the
petition for certiorari was filed in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, I submitted a brief amicus
curiae on behalf of law professors specializing in maritime law. We supported the petition
and, without taking a side on the questions raised in this case about the maritime law of
punitive damages, called for their resolution. Our participation as amici ended when the
petition was granted. Later, I joined a panel of law professors mooting Exxon's counsel in
preparation for his oral argument. For their generous and expert assistance in the preparation
of this Article, I wish to thank Doris Morgan and Gail Zwimer of the Muse Law Library and
Christine Owen, Esq.
1. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003);
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001); BMW of N. Am.,
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includes a judicially manageable standard that protects a defendant
otherwise liable for punitive damages from awards that are so
excessive as to be unfair, that is, arbitrary and capricious. Punitive
damages are usually assessed by juries, subject to review by trial and
appellate courts.2 This initiative has sparked considerable controversy,
and the exact parameters of the constitutional standard are still far
from certain
Into this situation came the case of Exxon Shlpping Co. v Baker4
The case was one within admiralty jurisdiction, although by a tortuous
path it ended up in federal court based on federal questions.! Applying
federal maritime law, a jury assessed damages, both compensatory and
punitive. Trial by jury is not unheard of in cases in which maritime
law governs, but it is not the norm. Having already sketched out a
constitutional limit to the size of punitive damages,7 the Supreme
Court was presented in this case with an opportunity for something
humbler, that is, an opportunity to either find in federal maritime law
the same limit or else to set a different one within the constitutional
outer boundary. The Court chose to take a step, and no more, along
the latter course. The length of that step and where the next might
carry federal maritime law remain to be seen. The better view of what
has been decided in this case is a modest one.
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443
(1993); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
2. At common law (and nowadays absent a claim of unconstitutional excess), the
latter review for abuse of discretion by the former. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct.
2605, 2638, 2008 AMC 1521, 1556 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 433; see also Haslip, 499 U.S. at 15.
3. The body of academic commentary is big and still growing; it is also varied. See,
e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Alexia Brunet & Susan Spies Roth, An External Perspective on the
Nature of Noneconomic Compensatory Damages and Their Regulation, 56 DEPAuL L. REv.
1249 (2007); Scott Fruehwald, The Rehnquist Court and Horizontal Federalism: An
Evaluation and a Proposal for Moderate Constitutional Constraints on Horizontal Federalism,
81 DENY. U. L. REv. 289 (2003); Laura J. Hines, Due Process Limitations on Punitive
Damages: Why State Farm Won't Be the Last Word 37 AKRON L. REv. 779 (2004); Dan
Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94
CORNELL L. REv. 239 (2009).
4. 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2008 AMC 1521.
5. SeeEyak Native Vill. v. Exxon Corp., 25 F.3d 773, 779-82 (9th Cir. 1994).
6. By act of Congress, the option of trial by jury is available in admiralty cases from
the Great Lakes and connecting waterways, 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (2006), and in actions on
seamen's claims of personal injury arising from negligence on the part of their employers, 46
U.S.C. § 30104(a) (2006). See Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20, 1963 AMC
1093, 1096 (1963).
7. See supra note 2 and cases cited therein.
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II. A VERY BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF A WIDELY REPORTED CASE
After the tanker EXXON VALDEZ stranded on Bligh Reef in
Prince William Sound, some of her cargo of crude oil spilled, causing
substantial environmental damage Her owner and operator, Exxon
Shipping Company, pleaded guilty to violations of the Clean Water
Act9 and several other federal laws, paying fines of $25 million and
restitution of $100 million. Exxon also settled for $900 million claims
by the governments of the United States and the State of Alaska for
damage to the environment and made payments of $303 million in
settlements to fishermen, private property owners, and private parties.
Other litigants sued in the United States District Court for the District
of Alaska and were formed into three classes: Native Alaskans,
landowners, and commercial fishermen. A class was also formed of
more than 32,000 plaintiffs (including Baker) seeking punitive
damages. Before the district court, Exxon conceded its liability for
compensatory damages. Eventually, a jury heard evidence that
Hazelwood, the tanker's master, had been drunk when the accident
occurred, that he had left the vessel's bridge without an officer licensed
to pilot the Sound, and that Exxon had or should have taken notice that
he was an alcoholic who had resumed a habit of drinking on or before
duty. The jury found both Exxon and Hazelwood to have been
reckless and awarded compensatory damages of $287 million (from
which the court deducted prior voluntary payments, leaving a net of
$19,590,257) plus punitive damages of $5000 from Hazelwood and $5
billion from Exxon. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment on Exxon's liability, including
its liability respondeat superior for the recklessness of its captain, but
reduced the amount of the punitive damages award against the
company, eventually to $2.5 billion. The Supreme Court, on writ of
certiorari, vacated and remanded. Justice Alito did not participate.
In its review, the Court considered three questions of law,
disposing of two. Unanimously, the Court held that general maritime
law allows punitive damages in an action sounding in tort on a claim
for income lost by fishermen shut out of their fishing grounds after a
vessel's oil spill resulting from recklessness.'" Five members of the
8. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2611, 2008 AMC at 1522. This synopsis draws exclusively
from the opinion for the Court by Justice Souter. What the Supreme Court thought the facts
to be in this case is all that matters when examining what the Court subsequently decided
about the law to be applied to them.
9. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1319(c)(1) (2006).
10. See Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2616-19, 2008 AMC at 1529-32.
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Court agreed that general maritime law caps the amount of punitive
damages available in such a case at the amount of the compensatory
damages awarded." The Court divided evenly and therefore rendered
no judgment as to whether in such a case an owner otherwise faultless
may be vicariously liable for punitive damages warranted by
recklessness on the part of the master of its ship.
IIM. PRELIMINARY POINTS
Before turning to these dispositions and then to the question yet
open, some attention is due to the answers in Exxon Shipping Co. v
Bakerto three antecedent questions.
A. ThatRobins Dry Dock Is Subject to Exception Is No Longer for
Speculation in Other Courts
As a general matter, maritime law does not allow an award of
compensatory damages for missed income opportunities or other
economic losses to a plaintiff who has not also suffered at the
defendant's hands physical injury to his person or property.2 Courts
and commentators trace this rule to the case of Robins Dry Dock &
Repair Co. v Flin'3 in which a time charterer was refused compensa-
tion for profits lost as a result of negligence by the shipyard that
delayed the chartered vessel's return to service. It is apparently still
good law.'" In 1986, the Supreme Court had occasion in East River
Steamship Corp. v Transamerica Delaval Inc. to consider "whether a
tort cause of action can ever be stated in admiralty when the only
damages sought are economic" but declined to reach the issue,
referring at that point to its decision in Robins Dry Dock.'5 According
to Professor Schoenbaum, this exclusionary rule is followed today
more or less faithfully in the United States Courts of Appeals for the
First, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits, "with less enthusiasm" in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and with
11. Id. at 2633, 2008 AMC at 1550.
12. See, e.g., ROBERT FORCE, ADMIRALTY AND MARTIME LAW 129-30 (2004);
THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, 2 ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW § 14.7, at 124 (4th ed. 2004).
13. 275 U.S. 303, 309-10, 1928 AMC 61, 63-64 (1927).
14. See, e.g., Gas Natural SDG S.A. v. United States, 2008 AMC 2992, 2993 (2d Cir.
2008) (unpublished); Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 624, 1994 AMC
2705, 2707 (1st Cir. 1994).
15. 476 U.S. 858,871 n.6, 1986 AMC 2027,2038 n.6 (1986).
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exceptions based on foreseeability in the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Fourth and Sixth Circuits.'6
What allowed these plaintiffs to proceed nevertheless is an
exception for commercial fishermen first allowed by the Ninth
Circuit" and since allowed in the Fifth Circuit," and more recently in
the Fourth.'9 From the fact that the Supreme Court allowed these
plaintiffs any punitive damages at all, the inference is unavoidable that
the Court accepted first their standing to claim compensatory damages
that were strictly of the economic sort. (The Court was unanimous on
this point, albeit silently so.) Even more telling on this point, if more
were necessary, is the fact that five justices keyed their new cap on
punitive damages to the sum of the award of compensatory damages.
Thus, that maritime law allows qualifying fishermen past the bar of
Robins Dry Dock is confirmed to a very high level of certainty, that of
Wilburn Boat Co. v Fireman s Fund Insuance Co.2" The question left
open in East River is now closed. Somebody seeking only economic
damages can state a tort cause of action in admiralty.
B. That Martime LawAffords PuMntive Damages for Recklessness
Is No Longer for Debate
Not so long ago, many thought that punitive damages were less
generally available in cases governed by maritime law.2' More than a
16. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 12, at 124-25 n.8.
17. Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570, 1975 AMC 416,435 (9th Cir. 1974).
18. Louisiana v. M/V Testbank, 524 F. Supp. 1170, 1173-74, 1982 AMC 2246,
2250-51 (E.D. La. 1981), aff'o 728 F.2d 748, 1984 AMC 2951 (5th Cir. 1984), aft'd en
banc, 752 F.2d 1019, 1985 AMC 1521 (5th Cir. 1985).
19. Yarmouth Sea Prods., Ltd. v. Scully, 131 F.3d 389, 395-98, 1998 AMC 825,
833-38 (4th Cir. 1997).
20. Notwithstanding prior judgments to the contrary by at least two circuit courts of
appeals, the Supreme Court found in Wilbum Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 348
U.S. 310, 1955 AMC 467 (1955), that the maritime law of the United States does not include
a rule of literal compliance for marine insurance warranties. Two decades later, Gilmore and
Black characterized the Wilbum Boat case aptly as "persistently problematic." GRANT
GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 2-8, at 68 (2d ed. 1975). The
opinion by Justice Black for the Court in Wilbum Boat nevertheless suggests a severe
standard for confirming general maritime law, in effect, a rule that "it ain't" maritime law
until the Supreme Court says it is. See Joel K. Goldstein, The Life and Times ofWilbum
Boat: A Critical Guide (Part i), 28 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 395, 419-20 (1997). The wisdom of
such a standard is debatable; for now, its severity reinforces here an act of confirmation:
even to a Wilbum Boat level of certainty, the judgment in Baker proves that maritime law
allows commercial fishermen to recover for lost-profit opportunities notwithstanding the rule
of Robins Dry Dock.
21. See David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in American Martime Law, 28 J.
MAR. L. & CoM. 73, 116-17 (1997).
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decade ago, Professor Robertson wrote very persuasively to correct
that misunderstanding, but the small size of his data set left the matter
somewhat in doubt," as has the long silence of the Supreme Court.
That maritime law allows punitive damages when a defendant has
acted at least recklessly is now confirmed beyond peradventure, that is,
to a Wilbum Boat level of certainty.
C That a GenemlMaditme Law Govemsin Cases of TortIs
Confirmed
That maritime law, rather than that of the forum state, applies to a
tort potentially within admiralty's jurisdiction, even when that
jurisdiction has not been invoked, is confirmed."
Taking a cue from the reasoning of Justice Brandeis in his
opinion for the Court in Erie Railroad v Tompkins,4 Professors Clark"
and Young"6 have disputed the notion that the reference to cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in Article III of the U.S.
Constitution warrants a conclusion that federal judges may, when
exercising that jurisdiction, fashion rules of decision displacing state
law. Their notions have not found traction in the Supreme Court.
22. As Robertson makes clear, passage by Congress of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.
§ 30104 (2006), eventually complicated this question with a suggestion of legislative
preemption and concern for separation of powers. However, the question is purely one of
general maritime law for the period beginning with recognition of a federal maritime
jurisdiction in 1789 and ending shortly after passage of the Jones Act in 1920. From this
period, Robertson tendered fifty-nine cases governed by maritime law in which courts had
touched on the point of punitive damages, but in only fourteen of them were awards actually
made, and of those, only one was by a federal circuit court, Chamberlain v. Chandler, 5 F.
Cas. 413 (C.C.D. Mass. 1823) (No. 2575) (Story, J.), and none were affirmed by a circuit
court of appeals as punitive (or exemplary, or vindictive) damages per se. Robertson, supm
note 21, at 87-116.
23. Recall that the state law claims of this class of commercial fishermen were
removed more or less as fellow travelers, per 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2006), on the basis that it
was a federal question as to whether other plaintiffs with whom they were joined might
continue to press their claims in the wake of a federal consent decree. Eyak Native Vill. v.
Exxon Corp., 25 F.3d 773, 779-82 (9th Cir. 1994); see also In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp.
1509, 1515-16, 1991 AMC 1482, 1489-90 (D. Alaska 1991) (stating that claims must be
governed by maritime law, not Alaskan law).
24. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
25. Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reintepretation, 144 U.
PA. L. REv. 1245 (1996).
26. Ernest A. Young, It's Just Water:- Toward the Normalization ofAdiraty, 35 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 469 (2004); see Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 273 (1999); see also Louise Weinberg, Back to the Future: The New General Common
Law, 35 J. MAR. L. & COM. 523 (2004).
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Together with Norfolk Southern Railway v James N Kirby, Pty Ltd,27
the decision in this case should put the matter to rest. If a maritime
law made by judges in admiralty cases presents a contradiction to the
Supreme Court's view of Article III in 1938, it does not interest the
Supreme Court today.
So much for unavoidable inferences from what the Court decided
in Baker What was said in this case deserves as much attention as
what was left unsaid.
IV THE LOGIC OF MfILES vAPEXMARNE CORp DOES NOT DICTATE
PREEMPTION IN THIS CASE
It was argued for Exxon that even if the general maritime law
allowed punitive damages in some sorts of cases, they were preempted
in a case of this sort by the Clean Water Act,28 which imposed penalties
for pollution while expressly preserving preexisting rights to recover
damages for injury to private property.9 In Miles,0 the Supreme Court
had held unanimously3 ' that the Jones Act32 precludes judicial award (in
a nondependent mother's Moragne action arising from the death of a
seaman) of damages in compensation for loss of society.33 That
conclusion had proceeded from another, to wit, that the explicit
authorization of pecuniary damages in the Federal Employers Liability
Act (FELA)"4 leads to the inference that Congress intended to rule out
other sorts, not only in cases covered by that statute, but also in cases
covered by the Jones Act. Acknowledging the superiority of maritime
law made by Congress, the Court in Miles foreclosed a judicially
fashioned supplement to the pecuniary damages available according to
FELA and the Jones Act. In this case, the Court was invited to take a
syllogistic path: because Congress did not authorize punitive damages
for spills in violation of the Clean Water Act, Congress should be
presumed to have intended their preemption by the Act. The argument
failed to persuade. The Court acted unanimously when it ruled that the
Clean Water Act does not foreclose punitive damages in an action
27. 543 U.S. 14, 22-24, 2004 AMC 2705, 2710-11 (2004) (holding that federal
maritime law governs a claim of contract breach when that contract is maritime in nature,
even when diversity jurisdiction has been invoked).
28. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006).
29. Id§ 1321.
30. 498 U.S. 19, 1991 AMC 1 (1990).
31. Justice Souter did not participate. See id at 21, 1991 AMC at 1.
32. 46 U.S.C. § 30104(2006).
33. Miles, 498 U.S. at32, 1991 AMCat 11.
34. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2006).
2009] 1295
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where plaintiffs have sued for economic loss resulting from
environmental injury by a vessel. According to Justice Souter, it was
simply too hard for the Court to accept a conclusion that the Clean
Water Act, explicitly protective of the environment, forecloses sub
silentio compensatory damages of sorts other than mentioned, and that
made it just as hard to conclude that the Act forecloses punitive
damages for economic losses while allowing compensatory damages
for such losses. 5  Invoking United States v Texas,6 Justice Souter
noted the absence of a clear indication in the Clean Water Act of any
intent on the part of Congress to occupy the entire field, or else to
abrogate a principle of federal common law.
It is tempting to ascribe the Court's insistence on clear signals
from Congress when general maritime law is in jeopardy of
preemption to concern for "the characteristic features of the general
maritime law"37 with which the Court was once so preoccupied. It is
enough for now, however, to note that this Court agreed unanimously
that the "analytical framework of Mil&es ' does not force a conclusion
that the Clean Water Act preempts claims for punitive damages."
V SOMETIMES, PUNITIVE DAMAGES SHOULD NOT EXCEED IN
AMOUNT THE COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AWARDED
Having agreed that maritime law allows an award of punitive
damages in a case of economic loss resulting from recklessness and
that an award in this case is not preempted by statute, the Court could
turn to consideration of the amount of the award against Exxon. A
bare majority agreed that general maritime law generally caps the
amount of punitive damages available in such a case at the amount of
the compensatory damages awarded."0 Even Justices Scalia and
Thomas, who abjure judicial power to enforce the Due Process Clause
by capping punitive damages awarded by reference to state law, agreed
that the Court could and should make such a cap a part of our federal
35. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2619, 2008 AMC 1521, 1532
(2008).
36. 507 U.S. 529, 533-39 (1993) (holding that the Debt Collection Act, 31 U.S.C.
§ 3701, does not preempt U.S. Government claim under federal common law to prejudgment
interest).
37. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216, 1996 AMC 2076,2084 (1917).
38. Guevara v. Mar. Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496, 1506, 1995 AMC 2409, 2422-23
(5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (finding that the Jones Act forecloses punitive damages when
wrongful failure to pay maintenance and cure aggravates the injury).
39. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2619, 2008 AMC at 1532.
40. Id at 2633, 2008 AMC at 1550.
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maritime law. Those who disagreed did so on grounds of discretion
rather than jurisdiction; none disclaimed the authority.
What matters is the case type contemplated here. If what makes
this case suitable for capping is that it is one in which plaintiffs
suffered no physical damage to their persons or property, then this
cap's future application depends on the reach of the rule of Robins Dry
Dock. Having confirmed in this case the standing of commercial
fishermen to sue when their only loss is economic, the Court then sets
something of a limit on the punitive damages they may recover when
the defendant's conduct is no worse than reckless." Seen in this way,
the cap applies only to those privileged to sue for lost profit
opportunities when all others are barred.
What also matters are the case types distinguished by the Court
and therefore unlimited by this cap. The Court apparently does not
intend this cap for cases in which the defendant's conduct is intentional
or malicious, or in which the defendant's behavior was driven primarily
for desire for gain, or in which the economic harm does not otherwise
afford plaintiffs sufficient incentive to recoup their losses, or in which
the harm eludes detection for want of incentive.42
Seen in this light, the cap is an undertaking more modest in scope
than in drama.43
VI. IT REMAINS To BE SEEN WHETHER AN OWNER OTHERWISE
WITHOUT FAULT WILL BE LIABLE VICARIOUSLY FOR PUNITIVE
DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE RECKLESSNESS OF THE SHIP'S MASTER
Conspicuously left open by the decision in this case is the
question of whether the general maritime law ought to allow an award
of punitive damages against an otherwise faultless shipowner on the
41. That the Court contemplated conduct more blameworthy without reaching it with
this cap seems clear from the Court's notice of the fact that the jury was not asked to consider
the possibility of fault worse than reckless. Id. at 2614, 2008 AMC at 1525-26. On that
basis, the Court treated this case "categorically as one of recklessness." Id at 2631 n.23,
2008 AMC at 1548 n.23.
42. Id at 2631, 2008 AMC at 1548.
43. Nothing was said about how what might have happened should factor in,
although the jury was instructed to take it into account and the district court found it relevant
on review of the verdict amount. Setting out for the Court the facts on which its several
decisions apparently were based, Justice Souter described how Hazelwood tried to rock his
ship free of the reef, "a maneuver which could have spilled more oil and [could have] caused
the ship to founder." Id at 2613, 2008 AMC at 1524. But otherwise the Court did not
express itself on what greater havoc might have been wrought by the captain's recklessness,
so it is not certain whether in future cases what might have happened should be considered in
setting a higher or lower cap than this one.
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basis of respondeat superior when its captain's own conduct qualifies
as reckless or worse. This point was unsettled before, and still is. The
Court in this case must have regarded the Exxon Shipping Company as
itself reckless." Nevertheless, it undertook to decide whether the
company might otherwise be liable for the recklessness of the master
of the EXXON VALDEZ. The Court divided equally, leaving
undisturbed the ruling of the Ninth Circuit." No justice offered an
opinion on the point.
Perhaps there is a message to be decoded from the transformation
of this question in the course of the Court's opinion. In its petition for
certiorari, Exxon asked the Court to take up the question:
May federal maritime law impose punitive damages on a shipowner [as
the Ninth Circuit held, contrary to decisions of the First, Fifth, Sixth,
and Seventh Circuits] for the conduct of a ship's master at sea, absent a
finding that the owner directed, countenanced, or participated in that
conduct, and even when the conduct was contrary to policies
established and enforced by the owner?"6
As paraphrased by Justice Souter, however, the first question for which
a writ of certiorari was granted was "whether a shipowner may be
liable for punitive damages without acquiescence in the actions
causing harm."' Later in the same opinion, the Court stated, "We
granted certiorari to consider whether maritime law allows corporate
liability for punitive damages on the basis of the acts of managerial
agents... .,,8 Thus the question seems to have been bandied about in
various degrees of generality. As originally posed by Exxon, the
question is peculiar to maritime law: whether a shipowner otherwise
innocent is liable in punitive damages for misconduct on the part of the
master. A moment's reflection on the term masteritself offers a handle
for answering that question-or at least for limiting its answer: any
employer may have countless agents, but a ship can have but one
master, to be distinguished therefore from all others acting for the ship
on the owners' authority.
Only two persons were judged to be reckless in this case, the
company and Captain Hazelwood. It was not suggested to either the
44. According to the Court's opinion, "the jury found both Hazelwood and Exxon
reckless and thus potentially liable for punitive damages." Id at 2614, 2008 AMC at 1525-
26 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 2616, 2008 AMC at 1526-28.
46. Brief for Petitioners at i, Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (No. 07-219).
47. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2611, 2008 AMC at 1522.
48. Id at 2614, 2008 AMC at 1526.
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jury or the Supreme Court that dereliction by the ship's third officer
(without which the grounding could not have occurred) ought to be
imputed to the company. Nor was it suggested that recklessness on the
part of those shoreside managers responsible for leaving Captain
Hazelwood in command (when they knew he had resumed drinking)
should not be imputed. Indeed, the only question presented by the
petitioner and prompted by the facts is one of imputing liability to the
company for the actions of a ship's master while his ship was
underway. If in other cases, setting a boundary line for imputing to the
company somewhere along a continuum of managerial authority might
be arbitrary or at least troublesome, " it is not here. Among managerial
agents, the master is sui generis.
On this question, consider the Fire Statute," in which it seems
settled that Congress has excused shipowners from vicarious liability
for even compensatory damages to those suffering property loss or
damage from fire aboard ship caused by recklessness on the part of her
crew. Consider also the Limitation of Liability Act,5' in which it seems
settled that Congress has capped at the value of a ship the vicarious
liability of her owners for even compensatory damages to those
suffering property loss or damage caused by recklessness on the part
of her crew. In such a legal tableau, it is not unreasonable for the Court
to fashion for a shipowner that is blameless--even negligent-a
monetary cap on punitive damages assessed for the recklessness of the
crew. But the recklessness contemplated here is exclusively that of the
master of the EXXON VALDEZ, and it is far from settled that the
Limitation Act protects an owner from vicarious liability for the
negligence of the master.3 Indeed, with respect to claims of personal
49. "Unfortunately, no good definition of what constitutes a managerial capacity has
been found,' and determining whether an employee meets this description requires a fact-
intensive inquiry." Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 543 (1999) (citations and
internal quotations omitted) (remanding punitive damages award for further inquiry
regarding employer's good faith efforts to forestall unlawful discrimination).
50. 46 U.S.C. § 30504 (2006).
51. Id. § 30506.
52. The Court notes that the grounding resulted from the failure, after Hazelwood
had left the bridge, of the ship's third mate to turn her back into the channel as he had been
ordered, but makes nothing more of it. Baker, 128 S. Ct. at 2612, 2008 AMC at 1523. Had
that nonfeasance also been considered, it would have invited the question of whether it could
be imputed to either the master or the shipowner in a way that left either liable.
53. Precedents are scarce and commentators are divided. According to Schoenbaum,
"[f]or purposes of establishing privity or knowledge regarding limitation as to personal injury
and death claimants, but not for property loss claimants, the privity or knowledge of the
master of the vessel is deemed conclusively the privity or knowledge of the owner."
SCHOENBAUM, supm note 12, § 15-7, at 154 (emphasis added) (citing 46 U.S.C. § 183(e)
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injury or death, Congress has settled the matter: privity or knowledge
of the master at the beginning of a voyage is imputable to owners
attempting to avail themselves of the privilege of limiting their
liability
4
For the proposition that by our general maritime law an owner is
not liable to the extent of exemplary or punitive damages for
qualifying misconduct on the part of his ship's master, in which the
owner did not at least acquiesce, TheAmiable Nancy5 is ever invoked.
The authority of that case has already been called into question on at
least two grounds. It seems generally agreed that Justice Story's
statement is at best dictum, given both the manner in which it was
framed and the fact that the owners of the abused brig claimed only
compensatory damages (and were refused so much of them as were
claimed for lost profits). 6 It has been pointed out also that this case
arose from a stop at sea of the AMIABLE NANCY by an armed
(recodified at 46 U.S.C. § 30506); Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Armco Steel Corp. (The
Mormackite), 272 F.2d 873, 1960 AMC 185 (2d Cir. 1959)). In Moore-McCormacl the
court of appeals agreed that the corporate shipowner should be refused limitation when ship
and cargo were lost as a consequence of an uncalibrated stabilogauge. What was therefore
said about privity and knowledge imputed from her master was dictum.
For the proposition that knowledge or privity of a ship's master cannot be imputed to
her corporate shipowner, David E.R. Woolley in 3 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 42, at 5-17
n.4 (rev. ed. 2008), cites Lord v. Goodall, Nelson & Perkns Steamship Co., 15 F. Cas. 884
(C.C. Cal. 1877) (No. 8506), aiTg' 102 U.S. 541 (1881), where again the point is only
dictum. Also cited is Quinlan v. Pew, 56 F. 111 (1st Cir. 1893), which, on its facts, is equally
inapt and therefore offers more dictum, but Judge Putnam refers at page 115 to Butler v.
Boston & Savannah Steamship Co., 130 U.S. 527 (1889), in which the Supreme Court
approved limitation after a vessel struck a rock off Martha's Vineyard while under the control
of her second mate, not licensed to pilot those waters. According to the Court, unanimously
per Justice Bradley, placing a competent officer in charge while underway was the duty of
her master, unimputable to her owners.
By virtue of his office and the rules of maritime law, the captain or master has
charge of the ship and of the selection and employment of the crew, and it was his
duty, and not that of the owners, to see that a competent and duly qualified officer
was in actual charge of the steamer when not on the high seas.
Butler, 130 U.S. at 554; see also La Bourgogne, 210 U.S. 95 (1908) (holding unanimously
per Judge White that owners were entitled to limitation when their vessel was lost by
collision after speeding in fog). "[Tlhe burden of proving that ... a willful departure [by
ship's officers] from [standing orders to go slowly in fog] was indulged in, and was brought
home to or countenanced by the [company], was cast upon the claimants." La Bourgogne,
210 U.S. at 126-27.
54. "In a claim for personal injury or death, the privity or knowledge of the master or
the owner's superintendent or managing agent, at or before the beginning of each voyage, is
imputed to the owner." 46 U.S.C. § 30506(e).
55. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546, 558-59, 2000 AMC 2693, 2700-02 (1818).




schooner cruising under a U.S. letter of marque, so that, while the case
itself is within instance jurisdiction, Justice Story's solicitude for the
owner of the abusing schooner ought to be viewed as peculiar to those
offering their vessels for national service in time of war."
There is yet a third objection to be made to the relevance of
Justice Story's remark. The misconduct that he had in view was not
that of the schooner's master, but that of a boarding party directed by
her first officer. Indeed, in the court martial that followed, the master
of the privateer was not among those charged. Rather, he testified for
the prosecution against the members of the boarding party, under oath
denying even knowledge of what had transpired that day aboard the
brig and out of his sight and reach. 8 That a shipowner ought not to be
liable in exemplary or punitive damages for misconduct by a master of
its choosing and enjoying its confidence hardly follows from a case in
which the Supreme Court expressed its reluctance to make such an
award against the innocent owner for misconduct of crewmen of which
even their captain was ignorant.
Whether the master is manager so that his misconduct is that of
the company itself, or else servant capable of independent conduct for
which the company might be liable only vicariously is a fine question.
That the damages in question are compensatory or punitive should not
influence the answer, because each sort serves its own purpose. What
should matter is the extent to which the master actually exercises
discretion at the behest of the owners. On the basis of nothing more
than tradition, perhaps, the masters of seagoing vessels ought to be
presumed part of management, on the assumption that they can still
hire and fire, pledge the ship for necessaries, and bind her in a contract
with her salvors. Out of respect for changing conditions in the
industry, such a presumption ought to be rebuttable, enabling the
owners to prove that their arrangement with the master of their vessel
reserved for a superior ashore such powers. A fine line would then be
presented to owners: on one side of it, the chance to escape vicarious
liability by proving they denied their master in name the authority and
autonomy traditionally evoked by such a title; on the other, the risk of
thereby confirming shoreside mismanagement of the sort found here.
57. Id at 21-22; see also Brief for the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's
Associations and the Institute for Fisheries Resources, as Amici Cuiae in support of
Respondents at 13-14, Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (No. 07-219).
58. See Court Martial for the Trial of Sundry Seamen at the Navy Yard Charlestown,
Jan. 25, 1815, microformed on Records of General Courts Martial and Courts of Inquiry of
the Navy Department, 1799-1867, Reel 195 (Nat'l Archives & Records Serv.).
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
It should not be overlooked that this case confirms to the utmost
degree of certainty three points of maritime law anterior to the three
questions of law with which the Supreme Court was presented.
- Our general maritime law does not deny judges the power to
award punitive damages
- The barrier to recovery of economic damages found in Robins
Dry Dock is porous; it permits such claims by fishermen, and
may permit others.
- Maritime law governs a tort within admiralty's jurisdiction even
when federal jurisdiction is invoked on another basis.
Otherwise, the case should be seen as responding with these
points of maritime law:
- The damages-limiting logic of Miles can be taken too far; it does
not foreclose awarding punitive damages in cases in which the
Clean Water Act is implicated.
- The amount of an award of punitive damages pursuant to
maritime law is limited in certain types of cases to the amount of
compensatory damages awarded. Cases in which the defendant's
conduct is more egregious than reckless are not so limited.
Indeed, the limit may apply only to cases in which an award of
economic damages is made notwithstanding the rule of Robins
Dry Dock
It remains to be seen whether a shipowner otherwise not
complicit may be liable vicariously for the recklessness of a master.
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